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1 Introduction
Income inequality in advanced economies has widened since the mid-1980s. This fact is
documented by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in
its 2008 report “Growing Unequal?”. According to this report, from the mid-1980s to the
mid-2000s, approximately two thirds of the OECD countries experienced widening income
inequality. Such increases in inequality in advanced economies appear inconsistent with
Kuznets’ inverted-U hypothesis, according to which income inequality in an economy in-
creases during early stages of economic development before beginning to decrease at some
point in the process of development as the economy matures (Kuznets, 1955).1
The upward trend in income inequality witnessed in advanced economies over the past
decades has drawn the attention of many researchers who have proposed several possible ex-
planations for this phenomenon. Among those who attribute increased income inequality to
skill-biased technological innovation, Galor and Moav (2000) develop a model that explains
income inequality not only between the two groups of skilled and unskilled workers but also
within these groups. Aghion et al. (2002) develop a model in which income inequality origi-
nates from the enlarged generality of new technologies.2 Others ascribe income inequality to
increased trade globalization (e.g., Wood, 1995, 1998) using the Heckscher-Ohlin model, in
which skilled workers in advanced economies benefit from trade globalization while unskilled
workers are disadvantaged.
Indeed, the above explanations based on the models of skill-biased technological innova-
tion and international trade are consistent with the recent increases in inequality in advanced
economies. Few researchers, however, have focused on the impact of financial globalization
on inequality within an economy.3
Since the early 1980s, international financial integration has advanced remarkably (Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007; Kose et al., 2009, 2010). Although the eﬀects of financial lib-
eralization on economic outcomes have been studied by many researchers,4 the eﬀects of
the combination of international financial integration and financial development on income
1There are debates regarding whether Kuznets’ hypothesis still holds. Some researchers support the
inverted-U hypothesis on the basis of the trickle-down view of development brought on by a new industrial
revolution of information technologies. See Piketty (2006).
2For empirical evidence of the eﬀects of technological advances on inequality, see Katz and Murphy (1992)
and Autor et al. (1998).
3The study by Mendoza et al. (2009) is a notable exception, as they compare dynamic behaviors of wealth
inequality in two countries facing diﬀerent degrees of financial development after financial liberalization and
demonstrate that after financial liberalization, a country with a fully developed financial market experiences
an increase in wealth inequality, whereas a country with a poorly developed financial market experiences
almost no change in its wealth inequality. They do not, however, examine how inequality responds to the
relaxation of credit constraints after financial liberalization. In contrast, as later described, we empirically
demonstrate that financial integration changes the manner in which financial development aﬀects income
inequality within an economy.
4For instance, Bekaert et al. (2005) provide evidence that equity market liberalization has a significantly
positive impact on economic growth, and Tressel and Verdier (2011) theoretically demonstrate that capital
account liberalization induces corruption in domestic banks in countries with institutional weaknesses.
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inequality within an economy remain unexplored. Specifically, it remains unclear whether
widening income inequality in the advanced economies is a consequence of continuing finan-
cial globalization. In this paper, we address this question.
Our empirical analysis of cross-country data and panel data from 1985 to 2009 demon-
strates that international financial integration changes the way in which financial develop-
ment aﬀects income inequality within an economy. Our findings are as follows. If there is a
high degree of financial openness in a country, financial market development widens inequal-
ity within that country, whereas if there is a low degree of financial openness in a country,
financial market development reduces inequality within that country.
While performing regressions, we must deal with the endogeneity problem associated
with financial development. On the one hand, in the traditional literature on finance and
growth, economists have carefully addressed causality from economic growth to financial
development. See Levine et al. (2000) and Levine (2005), among others. On the other hand,
since Galor and Zeira (1993) published their pioneering work, many economists have studied
the interaction between inequality and economic growth. For instance, in the literature on
political economy and economic growth, Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini
(1994), and Bertola (1993) demonstrate that inequality has a negative eﬀect on economic
growth in a politico-economic equilibrium. Galor and Moav (2004) develop a unified theory
of the eﬀects of inequality on the process of development. According to their model, a non-
monotonic relationship exists between inequality and economic growth. At early stages of
economic development, in which physical capital is the main engine of growth, inequality
has a positive impact on development. In contrast, at later stages of economic development,
when human capital is the main engine of economic growth, equality promotes human capital
investment and, thus, economic growth. In addition, focusing on the role of human capital
accumulation, Asano (2010) derives a non-monotonic relationship between inequality and
economic growth. According to Matsuyama’s (2002) model of mass-consumption economies,
some level of inequality is necessary for sustainable economic growth.
On the basis of the aforementioned studies, we argue that reverse causality from inequality
to financial development should be carefully controlled for. Following the standard approach
in the literature on finance and growth, we employ the instrumental variables (IV) technique
in the cross-country regressions using legal origins as the instrumental variables. Although
the Hansen tests for over-identifying restrictions and the tests of the excluded instruments
in the first-stage regressions confirm the validity of instrumental variables, one might argue
that legal origins aﬀect inequality through a channel diﬀerent from the financial market.
Therefore, we conduct a sensitivity analysis in the Appendix with respect to legal origins
and verify that each legal origin does not have a direct eﬀect on inequality under the condition
that the other legal origin satisfies the orthogonality condition. Moreover, to complement
the cross-country analysis, we also perform a dynamic panel data analysis using the system
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators developed by Arellano and Bond (1991),
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Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998). The dynamic panel data analysis
produces results consistent with those of the cross-country analysis.
Our empirical findings regarding the relationship between finance and inequality are
novel in the extant literature. Several related studies using panel data or cross-country data,
such as Li et al. (1998), Clarke et al. (2006), and Beck et al. (2007), have empirically
demonstrated that as the financial sector fully develops, income inequality decreases. No
previous study, however, has examined the eﬀect of financial integration on the relationship
between financial development and inequality.
Our theoretical model provides a possible explanation for our empirical findings. Specif-
ically, if an economy is financially closed to the world market, its financial market clears
within the economy. In this case, as the financial market matures, less-talented agents are
more likely to lend their financial resources to talented agents. Accordingly, production in-
eﬃciency is reduced, and the less-talented agents benefit from the abilities of the talented
agents. Thus, financial development narrows inequality. In contrast, if an economy is fi-
nancially open to the world market, the talented agents borrow production resources at the
world interest rate as long as credit constraints permit them to do so, whereas the less-
talented agents lend their resources in the world financial market. In such an economy, if the
financial market fully develops and credit constraints relax, the talented borrowers benefit
from borrowing in the world financial market at an interest rate that is low relative to their
abilities. This leaves the less-talented lenders unable to utilize the abilities of the talented
agents. Thus, inequality widens as the financial market matures.
Although many researchers have examined the relationship between financial develop-
ment and inequality in the vast literature on finance, growth, and inequality,5 they have
obtained mixed theoretical results. Although Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) derive an “in-
verted U-shaped” relationship between income inequality and financial development, Galor
and Zeira (1993) and Banerjee and Newman (1993) demonstrate the existence of a “negative
linear” relationship between the two. None of these researchers, however, has demonstrated
that international financial integration changes the way in which financial development af-
fects income inequality.
The key mechanism of our theoretical model is capital inflow in an economy from abroad.
If an economy is financially open to the world market, capital flows in or flows out of the
economy. If a country is a closed economy, an interest rate increases as the domestic financial
market matures because the demand for private credit increases. In contrast, if a country
liberalizes its capital account, an increase in demand for private credit in the domestic
market induces capital inflow from abroad without increasing the interest rate. Again, in
our theoretical model, the increased private credit is intensively used by talented agents,
and thus, inequality widens. If the mechanism of our theoretical framework is correct, it can
be observed in practice that an increase in domestic private credit causes capital inflow. In
5For a survey of finance and inequality, see Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Levine (2009).
4
section 6, we verify this hypothesis by performing the system GMM estimations.
This paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we describe the estimation
method, specifying the estimation equations for the cross-country analysis as well as for
the dynamic panel analysis. In section 3, we provide a description of the data used in our
estimation, and we obtain the estimation results in section 4. In sections 5, we develop an
overlapping generations model to provide a possible explanation for our empirical findings.
In section 6, we empirically verify the key mechanism of our theoretical model. In section 7,
we present our concluding remarks.
2 Estimation Method
As discussed in the Introduction, we examine the hypothesis that if an economy is highly
open to the world financial market, income inequality widens as the financial market matures,
whereas if an economy is highly closed, income inequality narrows as the financial market
matures. We empirically test this hypothesis by analyzing cross-country data and panel data.
Although the availability of the data for each country varied, we were able to collect data for
more than 100 countries (i.e., more than those of other studies in the existing literature).6
2.1 Cross-country Analysis
In our cross-country analysis, we use the averaged data from 1985 to 2009 for 119 countries
listed in Table A1 in Appendix A.1. We estimate an equation specified as
Inequalityi = α1 + α2Financial Developmenti +Xiβ + ²i, (1)
where i shows a country and ² is an error term. As will be explained in the next section,
we use the Gini coeﬃcient developed by Solt (2009) as a proxy for inequality. To measure
financial market development, we use the ratio of private credit to the gross domestic product
(GDP). The annual data for these two variables are averaged over the period 1985 to 2009. X
encompasses other control variables pertaining to the country such as the natural logarithm
of per capita real GDP, the average years of total schooling as a proxy for human capital,
the democracy indicator, and the extent of political risk. For these explanatory variables,
we use the data points in 1985, the initial year of our estimation, presuming that the average
inequality from 1985 to 2009 is aﬀected by the predetermined social conditions. See the next
section for more details of the data descriptions. According to our hypothesis, the highly
open financial market in a country results in a positive value of α2, whereas the highly closed
financial market results in a negative value of α2.
When performing regressions, the endogeneity problem associated with financial devel-
opment must be addressed to avoid the possibility of reverse causality from inequality to
6For instance, the number of observed countries in Beck et al. (2007) is, at most, 72.
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financial development.7 As previously discussed, to address the endogeneity problem, we
employ the IV technique, in which we use legal origins as instrumental variables. As such,
we follow Levine et al. (2000), among others. According to the legal origin theory developed
by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998), when compared to civil law countries, common law coun-
tries provide better protection of property rights, which impacts the development of financial
markets.8
To measure the extent of financial openness, we refer to the work of Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2007). Specifically, their dataset allows us to compute the sum of total assets and
total liabilities divided by the GDP. Because the data points of the dataset created by Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) are only available up to 2007, these are averaged for the period
1985 to 2007. We use this measure as a proxy for financial openness. This variable is thought
of as a de facto measure of financial openness.9 The averaged values of this financial openness
index from 1985 to 2007 range from 0.428 to 140.365 for 177 countries, with larger values
indicating greater openness. The averaged value over the countries of the averaged values is
2.766.10
Before testing our hypothesis, we have to determine cutoﬀs to define highly open countries
and highly closed countries. When making this determination, we face a trade-oﬀ between
maintaining an adequate sample size and ensuring the precision of the extent of financial
openness. For instance, if we had included only countries whose index values are extremely
high, then we would have been certain of examining the countries that were financially open
to the world market, but the sample size would have been too small to perform estima-
tions. The same situation would have occurred if we had included only those countries with
extremely small index values.
By considering countries with an index value greater than the 60th percentile of the 177
countries listed in the dataset of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) as highly open countries,
we categorize 42 of the 119 countries in our analysis as highly open, a group that includes
not only advanced but also developing countries (see Table A1 in Appendix A.1). To per-
form robustness checks, we create two other datasets for highly open countries. We create
one dataset of countries whose index values are greater than the median value (the 50%
percentile) and the other dataset of countries whose index values are greater than the 75th
7As discussed in the Introduction, researchers have carefully treated causality from economic growth and
financial development in the traditional literature on finance and growth. See, for instance, Levine et al.
(2000) and Levine (2005). Moreover, the eﬀect of inequality on economic growth has been studied by many
economists. See Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Asano (2010), Galor and Moav (2004), Matsuyama (2002),
Persson and Tabellini (1994), and Bertola (1993), among others.
8See La Porta et al. (2008) for more discussion of the legal origin theory.
9A de facto measure of financial openness is considered more appropriate than a de jure measure. See
Kose et al. (2009, 2010) for this discussion.
10Although 178 countries are available in the dataset of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), we excluded
Taiwan from our analysis because it is not included in the World Development Indicators by the World Bank
(2011b). We also excluded Luxemburg from our regression analysis. This is because the highest index value
of financial openness, 140.365, is for Luxemburg and the second highest is Bahrain, which is 19.670, implying
that Luxemburg is regarded as an outlier.
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percentile. Thus, the two datasets include 56 and 26 countries, respectively.
As for financially closed countries, we create a dataset for the 49 highly closed countries
with index values less than the 40th percentile of the 177 countries. To perform robustness
checks, we also create two datasets consisting of the 63 countries whose financial openness
values fall below the median value and the 31 countries whose financial openness values are
below the 25th percentile.
2.2 Panel Data Analysis
We also perform the dynamic panel data analysis, which is a complement to our cross-country
analysis, by using the system GMM estimators developed by Arellano and Bond (1991),
Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998). The system GMM estimation
enables us to control for unobserved country-specific eﬀects and to address the endogeneity
problems by employing the internal lagged variables as the instrumental variables. We
collected unbalanced panel data for 120 countries from 1985 to 2009 and created five-year
averaged data for the non-overlapping five periods: 1985 to 1989, 1990 to 1994, 1995 to
1999, 2000 to 2004, and 2005 to 2009.11 The use of the five-year averaged data enables us
to mitigate noises associated with short-run economic fluctuations.
Unlike the cross-country analysis, we do not divide the entire sample into highly open
and closed countries because we need as many countries as possible in performing the system
GMM estimation, which is designed for dynamic panel data with few time series and many
cross sections (see for instance Roodman, 2009). Instead, we add the interaction term
between financial development and financial openness to demonstrate our hypothesis. The
estimation equation is specified as
Inequalityit = α1Inequalityit−1 + α2Financial Developmentit (2)
+α3Financial Developmentit × Financial Opennessit +Xitβ + μt + ηi + ²it,
where i and t stand for a country and time, respectively. μ is a time-specific eﬀect, η is a
country-specific eﬀect, and ² is an error term. X includes control variables similar to those of
the cross-country analysis plus financial openness. In contrast to the cross-country analysis,
we use the five-year averaged control variables in this dynamic panel analysis.
The partial eﬀect of financial development on inequality is given by α2 + α3×Financial
Openness. Our hypothesis predicts that α2 is negative and α3 is positive, implying that
financial development decreases inequality when financial openness is of the low degree and
increases when financial openness is of the high degree.
To obtain consistent estimates, we must address the validity of the instruments and thus
we conduct two specification tests. The first test examines the hypothesis that the error
11Again, because the financial openness index computed from the dataset by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2007) is only available up to 2007, the data points are averaged from 2005 to 2007 for the last period.
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terms are not serially correlated. We test whether the diﬀerenced error terms are second-
order serially correlated. The second test is the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions,
which examines the orthogonality conditions of the instrumental variables.
We must also consider a small sample bias associated with an estimate of the variance-
covariance matrix when performing the two-step system GMM estimation because the num-
ber of countries in our dataset is at most 114.12 In the second-step estimation, the residuals
from the first-step estimation are used to produce a consistent estimate of the variance-
covariance matrix; however, the obtained estimate of the variance-covariance matrix is
severely downward biased if the sample size is small. Windmeijer (2005) develops corrected
standard errors to correct such a small sample bias. We report Windmeijer’s (2005) corrected
standard errors in our estimation results when performing the system GMM.
3 Data
Apart from the financial openness index computed from the dataset by Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2007), we draw the data used in our estimations from various databases and create
cross-country and panel datasets using the annual data over the period 1985 to 2009. To
measure inequality, we use the net Gini coeﬃcient in the dataset developed by Solt (2009).13
Cross-country comparison of income inequality by using the existing inequality data has
faced limitations such that while greater coverage across countries and over time is available,
comparability across observations is untrustworthy. To overcome these limitations, Solt
(2009) standardizes the United Nations University’s World Income Inequality Database such
that cross-country comparison of income inequality can be more reliable than when using
the existing inequality data. Solt’s algorithm creates standardized Gini coeﬃcients for 173
countries.
As a measure of financial market development, we use the ratio of private credit to the
GDP (abbreviated as “private credit” henceforth), obtained from Beck et al. (2010). In
the literature on finance and growth, private credit is often used as a measure of financial
market development (Aghion et al., 2005; Levine, 2005). We include the log of per capita
real GDP to control for the eﬀect of economic development on inequality. We collected the
per capita real GDP data from the World Development Indicators database, created by the
World Bank (2011b).
The average years of total schooling index created by Barro and Lee (2010) is likely to
control for the impact of human capital on inequality. The PRS Group (2011) provides a
political risk rating consisting of 12 sub-components, as described in detail in Table A2 in
Appendix A.1. The index for democracy, democratic accountability, is one of these sub-
12Note that although we collected the unbalanced panel data for 120 countries, the sample size for each
regression is reduced if we incorporate control variables.
13We employ the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (Version 3.0, released July 2010) devel-
oped by Solt (2009).
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components, which likely controls for the impacts of political events on inequality. Although
the original data range from 0 (autocratic) to 6 (democratic), we rescale this variable from
0 (autocratic) to 100 (democratic). Furthermore, we also include the overall political risk
rating provided by the PSR Group (2011). These data are ranged from 0 (highest risk)
to 100 (lowest risk). The full list of countries is shown in Table A1 in Appendix A.1.
Detailed definitions and sources of all the data are presented in Table A2 in Appendix A.1,
and descriptive statistics of all variables for cross-country and panel analyses are shown in
Tables A3 and A4 in Appendix A.1.
4 Results
4.1 Cross-country Analysis
Table 1 presents estimation results for the entire sample of 119 countries. As can be observed
in the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations in column (1), in which per capita GDP and
education are controlled for, the coeﬃcient of private credit is negative, which is consistent
with the findings of Clarke et al. (2006). The eﬀect of private credit on inequality, however,
is not statistically significant and remains insignificant even if democracy and political risk
are controlled for in columns (2) to (3).
[Table 1 here]
Because the OLS estimations may suﬀer from the endogeneity problem, we perform
IV estimations using legal origins as instrumental variables. Columns (4) to (6), whose
specifications are respectively the same as those in columns (1) to (3), show the IV estimation
results where French and German legal origins are employed as instrumental variables.14
Although columns (4) and (5) report that the coeﬃcients of private credit are negative and
significant, column (6) indicates that the coeﬃcient of private credit is not significant when
controlling for various explanatory variables despite the negative sign of the coeﬃcient.15
While private credit seems to have a negative impact on inequality, the whole sample
regression analysis does not uncover our hypothesis which suggests that international finan-
cial integration changes the way in which financial development aﬀects income inequality
within an economy. To investigate our hypothesis more formally, we created a dataset of 42
countries whose financial openness are above the 60th percentile.
14If we had used three of the five variables of English, French, German, Scandinavian, and Socialist legal
origins as instrumental variables for private credit, as does the literature on finance and growth, the F -
values for the tests of the excluded instruments in the first-stage regressions would have been extremely
low. Therefore, following Alfaro et al. (2004), we use only French and German legal origins as instrumental
variables for private credit in our estimations shown in columns (4) to (6) in Table 1.
15In columns (4) to (6), the F -values for the tests of the excluded instruments in the first-stage regressions
are slightly low. However, our interest is in estimations for highly open countries and highly closed countries.
Therefore, we do not conduct further analysis for the whole sample.
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As shown in columns (1) to (3) of Table 2, the OLS estimation results for these 42 highly
open countries indicate that the coeﬃcients of private credit are statistically insignificant
although they are negative.
[Table 2 here]
These results should be treated as tentative because we did not address endogeneity in
our analysis. To address this problem, we perform IV estimations using the Scandinavian and
Socialist legal origins as instrumental variables for private credit.16 To verify the validity of
the instrumental variables, we first address the problem of weak instruments. In columns (5)
and (6), the F -values for the tests of the excluded instruments in the first-stage regressions
are greater than 10, satisfying the “rule of thumb” proposed by Staiger and Stock (1997)
although the F -value in column (4) is 5.94. Moreover, the Hansen tests of overidentifying
restrictions do not reject the orthogonality conditions at the conventional significance level in
all the estimations reported in columns (4) to (6). These results support the appropriateness
of using Scandinavian and Socialist legal origins as instrumental variables for private credit in
our regressions. As shown in columns (4) to (6), the coeﬃcients of private credit are positive
and significant. Therefore, we conclude that financial development widens inequality in
financially open countries.
Next, we examine highly closed countries. According to our hypothesis, in a financially
closed economy that is closed to the world market, income inequality narrows as the financial
market matures. Therefore, we expect that an estimated coeﬃcient of private credit would
be negative for these countries.
Table 3 presents estimation results for 49 highly closed countries, all of whose financial
openness values are below the 40th percentile. The OLS estimation results in columns (1)
to (3) reveal that the eﬀect of private credit is statistically insignificant; however, these
OLS results may be biased and inconsistent because of an endogeneity problem associated
with private credit. To address endogeneity, we conduct IV estimations using French and
German legal origins as instrumental variables for private credit. The results of the F -tests
of the excluded instruments and of Hansen’s over-identifying restrictions tests imply that
these instruments are valid. The estimation results shown in columns (4) to (6) indicate
that private credit has a significantly negative impact on inequality even when controlling
for various explanatory variables. These results are consistent with our hypothesis, which
suggests that financial development narrows inequality in financially closed countries.
[Table 3 here]
In Appendix A.2, we perform robustness checks of our cross-country analysis on the im-
pact of private credit on inequality. We conduct the checks using the two datasets created for
16We use only Scandinavian and Socialist legal origins as instrumental variables for private credit in our
estimations, shown in columns (4) to (6) in Table 2, because these two legal origins even better identify
private credit in the first-stage regressions for the highly open countries than do other combinations of legal
origins.
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highly open countries and the two datasets created for highly closed countries, as described
in subsection 2.1. Tables A6 and A7 report the estimation results for 56 and 26 highly
open countries whose financial openness values are respectively above the 50th percentile
and the 75th percentile. These tables report the same qualitative impact of private credit
on inequality as in the IV estimation results in Table 2. Tables A8 and A9 show estimation
results for 63 and 31 highly closed countries whose financial openness values are respectively,
below the 50th percentile and the 25th percentile. While columns (5) and (6) in Table A9
report insignificance of the coeﬃcients of private credit, Tables A8 and A9 display the same
qualitative results as those in Table 3.
Because one may argue that legal origins aﬀect inequality through a channel diﬀerent
from the financial market, we perform a sensitivity analysis in Appendix A.2 following the
procedure employed by Tabellini (2010). We find that each legal origin used as an instru-
mental variable does not have a direct eﬀect on inequality under the condition that the other
legal origin satisfies the orthogonality condition. See Tables A10 and A11.
4.2 Panel Data Analysis
Although we have obtained the estimation results consistent with our hypothesis from the
cross-country analysis, we complement the analysis by performing a dynamic panel data
analysis. Table 4 shows the system GMM estimation results for 120 countries. In columns
(1) to (3), where the interaction term between private credit and financial openness is not
included, we find that private credit has no significant impact on inequality. Columns (4) to
(6) report the results with the interaction term. The partial eﬀect of financial development
on inequality is given by α2 + α3×Financial Openness from Eq. (2). We find in columns
(4) to (6) that α2 is negative and α3 is positive. Although the coeﬃcient of private credit,
α2, is insignificant, the null hypothesis of α2 = α3 = 0 is rejected by the F tests in columns
(4) to (6) at the conventional significance level. In column (6), for example, the threshold
value of financial openness, which divides countries into ones with a negative eﬀect of private
credit and ones with a positive eﬀect, is 1.163, which is approximately the 45th percentile of
financial openness in this sample. While private credit has a negative impact on inequality
below this threshold, it has a positive impact above this threshold. This result is consistent
with our hypothesis and our cross-country analysis.
An interesting, by-product result from columns (4) to (6) is that the partial eﬀect of
financial openness depends upon private credit. Because the coeﬃcients of financial openness
are negative and significant and the interaction terms of private credit with financial openness
are positive and significant, international financial integration widens inequality in a country
with a fully developed financial market, whereas it narrows inequality in a country with a
poorly developed financial market.
To confirm the validity of the set of instrumental variables, we perform the Hansen tests
for overidentifying restrictions. Under the moderate number of overidentifying restrictions
11
in columns (4) to (6), the Hansen tests for over-identifying restrictions do not reject the
orthogonality conditions at the conventional significance level. The consistency of the GMM
estimator also depends upon the validity of the assumption that there are no serial corre-
lations of the error terms ²it. We examine whether the diﬀerenced error terms are serially
correlated with respect to the second order. The Arellano-Bond serial correlation tests
(AR(2) tests) in all columns do not reject the null hypothesis of non existence of a second-
order serial correlation. The results of these two tests verify the validity of instrumental
variables.
[Table 4 here]
5 The Theoretical Framework
In this section, we propose a possible mechanism to explain our empirical findings by de-
veloping an overlapping generations model. In this economy, there are two types of capital.
The first is real capital used for final goods production, which is supplied by private agents.
One may think that the real capital broadly includes a combination of physical and human
capital. However, real capital is country-specific, and thus, it cannot be traded between
countries. The real capital depreciates entirely in one period. The second is financial cap-
ital, which is used as a resource for borrowing and lending. If countries are internationally
integrated, financial capital is traded in the international financial market.
5.1 Production Sector
Final goods are produced from real capital and augmented labor with a Cobb-Douglas pro-






where Yt is the output, Zt is the aggregate real capital, and Ht is the aggregate augmented
labor at time t. Following Romer (1986), labor is assumed to be augmented in terms of
increased productivity by knowledge spillover through learning-by-doing and/or on-the-job
training. Moreover, such knowledge spillover is assumed to be associated with the level of
economic development, which is reflected in per capita output. This external eﬀect is also
country-specific. More concretely, the augmented labor is given by
Ht = f(yt)Lt,
where y = Y/L and f(.) is an increasing function of y. Specifically, f(y) = y is assumed;
thus, technology exhibits constant returns to scale with respect to per young agent real
capital in equilibrium. The production sector is assumed to be perfectly competitive, and
thus, the production factors are paid their marginal products
qt = αYt/Zt
wt = (1− α)Yt/Lt,
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where q is the price of the real capital and w is the wage rate. Because Z broadly includes
not only physical capital but also human capital, q is also thought of as the salary rate of
human capital.
5.2 Agents
We consider an economy consisting of overlapping generations of young and old agents, each
of whom lives for two periods in which time expands from 0 to ∞. Assuming each agent’s
risk neutrality, the utility function is given by u(ct+1) := ct+1 such that each agent obtains
his/ her utility exclusively from his/her second-period consumption ct+1. The population of
each generation Lt is assumed to remain constant.
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The budget constraints of an agent in the first and second periods are given, respectively,
by
kt + bt ≤ wt (3)
and
ct+1 ≤ qt+1φkt + rt+1bt, (4)
where k is the investment in a project and b is the lending when positive and the borrowing
when negative. In the first period, each agent invests, borrows and/or lends. If an agent
begins investing in a project in the first period, he/she produces real capital, φk, which
he/she then sells to the final production sector at a certain price q in the second period.18 φ
is the productivity of real capital production and r is the gross (real) interest rate.
Owing to the agency problem in the financial market, investors face borrowing con-
straints. Following Aghion et al. (2005), the credit constraint facing each agent is given
by
bt ≥ −νwt, (5)
where ν ∈ [0,∞) is the extent of the credit constraint. Two microfoundations for Eq. (5) are
provided in Appendix A.3.19 Note that agents can borrow financial capital of a value up to
ν times more than the wealth that they earned in the first period. w can be regarded as the
down-payment for an investment project. The non-negativity constraint for the investment
project is given by
k ≥ 0. (6)
We now introduce agent heterogeneity in terms of productivity into the model. More
concretely, we assume that the productivity φ varies among agents and is distributed uni-
formly over [0, 1]. Each agent knows his/her own productivity at his/her birth but does not
know the productivity of other agents.
17The assumption of a constant population has no eﬀects on our results in the following analysis.
18If one regards φk as human capital, the project is thought of as the education investment.
19This type of assumption regarding credit market imperfections often appears in the literature. See
Aghion et al. (1999), Aghion and Banerjee (2005) and Aghion et al. (2005).
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Each agent maximizes ct+1 subject to inequalities (3)-(6). The maximization problem






1− μwt ≤ bt ≤ wt,
where μ := ν/(1 + ν). The solution to this problem now appears straightforward. If φt :=
rt+1/qt+1 > φ, it is optimal for an agent to choose bt = wt and kt = 0, whereas if φt < φ, then
it is optimal to choose bt = −μwt/(1 − μ) and kt = wt/(1 − μ). φt is a cutoﬀ that divides
agents into savers and borrowers. μ or ν is a measure of financial market development, as
discussed in Appendix A.3.




φktLtdφ = wt(1− φ
2
t )
2(1− μ) Lt. (7)
As Yt = A
1/αZt in equilibrium, the equilibrium capital price and wage become
qt = αA1/α,
wt = (1− α)A1/αzt,
where zt := Zt/Lt. As Lt+1 = Lt, Eq. (7) can be rewritten as
zt+1 =
(1− α)A1/α(1− φ2t )
2(1− μ) zt. (8)
5.3 Gini Coeﬃcient of a Closed Economy
In the following sections, the total population of each generation is normalized to one. In a
closed economy, the financial market at time t clears within the country and within generation
t. From the solution to the maximization problem for each agent, the financial market
clearing condition in a closed economy is given by
wtφt − μwt
1− μ(1− φt) = 0,
or equivalently,
φt = μ. (9)
We measure inequality among agents in terms of consumption (or, equivalently, income in
the second period). To obtain the Lorenz curve, we subsequently compute the average con-
sumption at time t, c¯t. Consumption of agents with φ < φt−1 is given by ct = φt−1αA1/αwt−1,















t−1 − 2μφt−1 + 1). (10)
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φ2t−1−2μφt−1+1 if 0 ≤ x < φt−1,
φ2t−1−2μφt−1x+x2
φ2t−1−2μφt−1+1 if φt−1 ≤ x ≤ 1.
As the Gini coeﬃcient is formulated by G := 1− 2 R 1
0
L(x; t)dx, we have
G =
2φ3t−1 − 3φ2t−1 + 1
3(φ2t−1 − 2μφt−1 + 1) . (11)
Substituting Eq. (9) into Eq. (11), the Gini coeﬃcient is given by
G =
−2μ2 + μ+ 1
3(μ+ 1) . (12)
The right-hand side of Eq. (12) is a decreasing function with respect to μ. Therefore, we
have established the basis for Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 In a closed economy, the Gini coeﬃcient decreases as the financial market
develops.
Proof. The claim follows from the fact that dG/dμ = −2μ(μ+ 2)/(3(μ+ 1)2) < 0. ¤
5.4 Gini Coeﬃcient of a Small Open Economy
We now consider an economy that opens its financial market to the world market. In a small
open economy, the world interest rate is exogenously given at rt = r¯. In this case, the cutoﬀ
φt is given by
φt = r¯αA1/α := φ¯. (13)
We assume r¯ < αA1/α such that borrowers always exist in the economy. While the cutoﬀ is
constant, as it is in a closed economy, it is independent of the degree of credit constraint,
μ. By substituting Eq. (13) into Eq. (11), we obtain the Gini coeﬃcient of the small open
economy as follows
G =
2φ¯3 − 3φ¯2 + 1
3(φ¯2 − 2μφ¯+ 1) .
In contrast with that of a closed economy, the Gini coeﬃcient of a small open economy is
an increasing function with respect to μ. Thus, we have established the basis for Proposition
2.
Proposition 2 In a small open economy, the Gini coeﬃcient increases as the financial
market develops.
Proof. It is obvious that dG/dμ > 0. ¤
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5.5 Discussion
Our theoretical analysis has allowed us to derive two propositions. In a closed economy, as
credit constraints relax, production resources are intensively used by the talented agents who
borrow financial capital from the less-talented agents in the economy. In turn, these less-
talented agents lend financial capital to the talented agents through the domestic financial
market. Thus, in a closed economy, the less-talented agents can utilize the abilities of the
talented agents, while the latter must pay a higher interest rate as credit constraints relax.
As a result, income inequality narrows as credit constraints relax.
In contrast, in a small open economy, the talented agents can borrow financial capital
in the world market at a low interest rate relative to their abilities. In this case, financial
capital flows in the economy and it is intensively used by talented agents. As a result, the
less-talented agents cannot utilize the abilities of the talented agents even though credit
constraints relax. Thus, inequality widens.
The key mechanism of our model is illustrated by a supply-demand analysis of the fi-
nancial market. From the optimal behavior of individuals, the aggregate supply of financial
capital in the economy is given by
F s := wtφt = wtαA1/α r.
The supply curve of financial capital is an increasing function of r. On the other hand, the
aggregate demand for financial capital is given by
F d :=
μwt




The demand curve is a decreasing function of r. The supply and demand curves are shown
by the SS locus and the DD locus in Figure 1, respectively. Let us consider the case in
which μ increases as the domestic financial market develops. In this case, the demand for
financial capital increases and then the demand curve rotates counterclockwise, while the
supply curve does not move.
[Figure 1 here]
Suppose that a country is a closed economy, in which the equilibrium interest rate is
determined at the intersection of the supply and demand curves. As seen in Figure 1, if
the demand increases and the demand curve rotates from D0D0 to D1D1, the equilibrium
interest rate increases. The increase in the interest rate leads to the decrease in the number of
investors. Moreover, the increase in the interest rate becomes a burden for investors, whereas
it becomes advantageous for lenders. That is why inequality narrows as the domestic financial
market develops.
Now consider the case in which a country opens its financial market to the world market
and becomes a small open economy. Because the world interest rate r¯ is constant, financial
capital flows in the country and the total liabilities increase when the demand for financial
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capital increases. In this case, even though the demand curve rotates from D0D0 to D1D1,
the number of investors does not decrease. Furthermore, each investor borrows more financial
capital in the world market than when μ is small, implying that financial capital inflows are
intensively utilized by investors. Because the interest rate does not increase, the lenders in
the country do not benefit from the development of the domestic financial market, whereas
the investors incur no burden, unlike the case of a closed economy. Accordingly, inequality
widens as the domestic financial market develops.20
We have obtained a by-product result in the panel data analysis that international fi-
nancial integration widens inequality in a country with a fully developed financial market,
whereas international financial integration narrows inequality in a country with a poorly de-
veloped financial market. See the partial eﬀects of financial openness on inequality shown in
columns (4) to (6) in Table 4. Figure 1 provides an explanation for this result. Consider two
countries whose supply curves of domestic financial capital are the same as given by the SS
curve in Figure 1. Suppose that the demand curves in countries 1 and 2 are, respectively,
given by the D1D1 and D2D2 curves, implying that the financial market in country 1 is
more fully developed than that in country 2. As seen in Figure 1, when country 1 is a closed
economy, its equilibrium interest rate is greater than the world interest rate, whereas when
country 2 is a closed economy, its equilibrium interest rate is less than the world interest rate.
Because country 1 opens its financial market to the world market, financial capital flows in
country 1. In this case, the number of borrowers increases because the world interest rate is
less than the equilibrium interest rate when country 1 was a closed economy. The declined
interest rate facing country 1 is beneficial to investors and disadvantageous to savers. As a
result, inequality widens in country 1. However, if country 2 opens its financial markets to
the world market, then financial capital flows out of country 2 and the number of borrowers
decreases because the world interest rate is greater than the equilibrium interest rate when
country 2 was a closed economy. The increased interest rate facing country 2 is beneficial to
savers and disadvantageous to borrowers. Therefore, inequality narrows in country 2.21
This section concludes with a remark on a large open economy. Our empirical exercise
includes large open economies such as the United States. The same idea as in the case
of a small open economy about the eﬀect of financial capital inflow on inequality can be
applicable to a large open economy. It is true that financial development in a large open
economy, leading to an increase in demand for financial capital, exerts upward pressure on
the interest rate. However, many rapidly growing countries in East Asia, such as China,
have participated in the world financial market since the early 1990s. Those rapidly-growing
countries, whose financial markets are not fully developed, provide the world market with a
significant amount of financial capital. The total supply of financial capital by those countries
20While Figure 1 illustrates only the case in which the net total liabilities are positive and, thus, the
country is a net borrower, the same mechanism works when the net liabilities are negative.
21The fact that the Gini coeﬃcient in Eq. (11) is a decreasing function with respect to φ confirms the
illustrative analysis with Figure 1.
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may likely oﬀset the upward pressure on the interest rate.22 Accordingly, the same idea, as
in the case of a small open economy, is applicable to a large open economy.
6 Financial Capital Inflow and Financial Development
As discussed in the previous section, the key mechanism of our theoretical framework is the
relationship between financial capital inflow in an economy and financial market develop-
ment. If the key mechanism is correct, we will observe in practice that an increase in private
credit in a country causes an increase in the total liabilities in that country. We empirically
verify this hypothesis in this section by using the system GMM estimators.23 The estimation
equation is specified as
Net Liabilitiesit = α1Net Liabilitiesit−1 + α2Financial Developmentit
+Xitβ + μt + ηi + ²it.
The three disturbance terms show the same variables as those in Eq. (2). Net liabilities repre-
sent the net liabilities/GDP ratio. The one-period lagged variable of the net liabilities/GDP
ratio in the right-hand side captures a persistence eﬀect of the past financial capital inflow in
the country, reflecting, for example, the agglomeration of investment from abroad. The set
of the control variables X includes the per capita GDP, political risk, inflation, and capital
controls.
We prepared two kinds of the net liabilities/GDP ratio to check the robustness for our
estimations, each of which is computed from the dataset created by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2007). The first is total liabilities minus total assets divided by the GDP in the dataset, and
the second is debt liabilities minus debt assets divided by the GDP. We assembled the data
for inflation provided by the World Bank (2011b). For capital controls, we use a measure of
capital account liberalization created by Chinn and Ito (2006, 2008). The Chinn-Ito index
is a de jure measure of capital account openness. Other variables are the same as those
used in previous empirical analyses. The data availability allowed us to prepare the dataset
for 120 countries from 1985 to 2009, listed in Table A1 in Appendix A.1. As in the panel
data analysis in the previous section, we use the five-year averaged data. The definitions
and sources of all the data are presented in Table A2 in Appendix A.1 and the descriptive
statistics are shown in Table A5 in Appendix A.1.
Table 5 reports estimation results for the relationship between the net liabilities and
domestic private credit. The validity of the instruments is confirmed by the tests for serial
correlations and by the Hansen tests as in the panel data analysis in the previous section. In
columns (1) to (3), where the total net liabilities are used as a dependent variable, we find
22Warnock and Warnock (2009) estimate that financial capital inflow in the United States has significantly
reduced the real interest rates in the country since the mid-1990s.
23To limit the number of the instrumental variables, we employ the collapsed form of instrument sets for
our regressions. See Roodman (2009) for more details.
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that private credit has a significantly positive impact on the net liabilities. For a robustness
check, columns (4) to (6) report the results of the case in which the net debt liabilities are
used. The eﬀect of private credit on the net debt liabilities is also significantly positive.
Therefore, an increase in domestic private credit causes an increase in the net liabilities in
a country, implying that the key mechanism of our theoretical framework is consistent with
the estimation results in Table 5.
[Table 5 here]
7 Concluding Remarks
Whether the combination of financial development and international financial integration
widens or narrows inequality within a country remains an open question. In this study,
we empirically demonstrated that if an economy is closed to the world financial market,
inequality within the economy narrows as its financial market develops; in contrast, if an
economy is open to the world financial market, inequality within the economy widens as
its financial market develops. We thus presented a possible explanation for our empirical
findings with an overlapping generations model.
Our findings have a policy implication for financially open countries. The degree of finan-
cial openness varies greatly among countries as demonstrated by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2007). The group of highly open countries in our empirical exercise consists of not only
highly developed countries but also less developed countries. These financially open coun-
tries experience increasing inequality as their financial markets mature. The financially open
countries that desire to decrease inequality resulting from having open financial markets
should consider implementing redistributional policies to mitigate the widening inequality if
they are oriented to equal societies.
While our results are novel, a caveat regarding them must be noted. We extracted
sub-samples from the entire sample in our cross-country analysis, and we incorporated the
interaction term between financial openness and private credit in our dynamic panel analysis.
These procedures did not allow us to control for other factors aﬀecting financial development
and inequality simultaneously, if they exist. Even with this caveat, our results provide a
possible explanation for the widening inequality observed in many advanced economies over
the past decades in terms of international financial integration and financial development.











We perform robustness analysis using the other datasets that we created for highly open
countries and highly closed countries. Table A6 presents the results obtained from our
dataset of the 56 highly open countries whose financial openness values are above the median
value (the 50th percentile). In the IV estimations in columns (4) to (6), the coeﬃcients of
private credit are significantly positive, and the overall results in Table A6 are consistent
with those in Table 2.
[Table A6 here]
Table A7 shows the estimation results for 26 highly open countries whose financial open-
ness values are above the 75th percentile. This table reports the same qualitative impact of
private credit on inequality as in the IV estimation results of Table 2 and table A6.
[Table A7 here]
Table A8 shows the results in the case of the 63 highly closed countries whose financial
openness values are less than the median value. In columns (4) to (6), the IV estimation
results indicate that an increase in private credit decreases inequality, which is consistent
with the results in Table 3.
[Table A8 here]
Table A9 presents the results for the 35 highly closed countries whose financial openness
values are below the 25th percentile. The coeﬃcient of private credit in column (4) is
significant and negative, although columns (5) and (6) show insignificant negative coeﬃcients
of private credit. The results for the insignificant coeﬃcients of private credit in columns (5)
and (6) are probably due to the reduced number of highly closed countries. The 25 observed
countries must have relatively homogeneous features in private credit and inequality.
[Table A9 here]
Next, we perform a sensitivity analysis to further check the validity of the instruments,
following the procedure of Tabellini (2010). Specifically, we add one of the two instrumental
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variables to the second stage regression as an explanatory variable, treating it as exogenous.
Under this specification, only the other legal origin is an excluded instrumental variable,
implying that the model is just identified. If the legal origins used in our estimations are valid
instrumental variables, they have no direct impact on inequality or have no impact through
channels other than private credit. In other words, if the legal origins are valid instrumental
variables, the coeﬃcient of legal origin directly added to the second stage regression should
have no impact on inequality under the condition that the other legal origin satisfies the
orthogonality condition.
Table A10 presents estimation results obtained from our data set of the 42 highly open
countries, the same country group as in Table 2. We find that the legal origin directly
included in the second stage regression has no significant impact on inequality and the
coeﬃcient of private credit is significantly positive, implying that the legal origins added to
the second stage regressions have no direct impact on inequality.
[Table A10 here]
The same procedure is conducted in Table A11 for 49 highly closed countries, the same
country group as in Table 3. We find that the legal origin directly included in second stage
regression has no significant impact on inequality, although the coeﬃcient of private credit
is not significant. Overall, these results reinforce the results of overidentification tests in our
estimations in the main text.
[Table A11 here]
A.3 Microfoundations for Credit Constraints
Two types of microfoundations for a credit constraint are described in this appendix.
Microfoundation I
Following Aghion and Banerjee (2005), we assume that credit market imperfections arise
simply from the possibility that borrowers may not repay their obligations.24
Each agent prepares his/her own wealth wt, which consists of wages earned when he/she
is young, to invest. His/her total resources are kt = wt − bt. The return on one unit
of investment is qt+1φ. If a borrower consistently repays his/her obligations, then he/she
earns a net income, qt+1φkt + rt+1bt. In contrast, if the borrower does not repay his/her
obligations, he/she incurs a cost δkt to hide his/her revenue. In such a case, a financial
intermediary monitors the borrower, and the intermediary is able to capture the borrower
with a probability of pt+1. In this case, his/her expected income is given by qt+1φkt − δkt +
pt+1rt+1bt
24Aghion et al. (1999) and Aghion et al. (2005) provide a microfoundation for a credit constraint in the
same manner as do Aghion and Banerjee (2005).
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Under this lending contract, the incentive compatibility constraint that incentivizes the
borrower not to default is given by
qt+1φkt + rt+1bt ≥ [qt+1φ− δ]kt + pt+1rt+1bt, (A1)





The left-hand side of Eq. (A1) is the revenue that the borrower acquires when he/she invests
in a project and repays his/her obligations, and the right-hand side is the gain when he/she
defaults. Eq. (A2) is independent of the return on one unit of investment.
To attain the probability pt+1 to detect the borrower’s deception, the financial intermedi-
ary incurs an eﬀort cost, btC(pt+1), which is increasing and convex with respect to pt+1. As in
Aghion and Banerjee (2005), we assume C(pt+1) = κ log(1−pt+1), where κ is strictly greater
than δ so that all borrowers face credit constraints more severe than their natural debt lim-




− pt+1rt+1bt − κ log(1− pt+1)bt.
As −bt > 0, this maximization problem is rewritten as
max
pt+1
pt+1rt+1 + κ log(1− pt+1).





As the interest rate rt+1 increases, the financial intermediary chooses the high probability to








As the agent’s productivity φ is not observable, the financial intermediary does not impose
agent-specific credit constraints; however, the financial intermediary must know the agent’s
wealth, wt. As long as it imposes a credit constraint given by inequality (A4) on all agents,
none will default in equilibrium. As δ < κ, we can let ν := δ/(κ− δ) ∈ [0,∞), and thus,
bt ≥ −νwt,
which is a credit constraint in the main text. δ and κ are associated with a default cost
and a monitoring cost, respectively. We can consider that as δ increases or κ decreases, a
financial market fully develops.
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Microfoundation II
We extend the microfoundation for a credit constraint developed by Antra`s and Caballero
(2009) in a manner suitable for our model. In particular, we consider the participation
constraint faced by the financial intermediary and the incentive compatibility condition of
the borrowers which incentivizes them not to default.
It is assumed that at the end of the first period of each borrower’s lifetime and after
investment has occurred, any borrower can abscond with no cost from carrying out his/her
investment project, taking some fraction of his investment, (1−μ)(wt−bt), where 0 < μ < 1,
and not repaying his obligations to the financial intermediary. In this case, the borrower will
engage in capital production somewhere and sell capital goods in a market.
If a borrower absconds at the end of the first period, then the financial intermediary can
reclaim the remainder of investment, μ(wt − bt). We assume that the financial intermediary
can relend the remainder of the investment in the financial market. Therefore, when the
financial intermediary makes a financial contract with a borrower, it faces a participation
constraint such that





On the other hand, the incentive compatibility constraint for a borrower, which incen-
tivizes him/her not to abscond from engaging in his/her project at the end of the first period,
is given by
φqt+1(wt − bt) + rt+1bt ≥ φqt+1(1− μ)(wt − bt). (A5)
For agents with φ such that rt+1 − μφqt+1 ≤ 0, Eq. (A5) always holds. Therefore, we focus




As φt/φ ≤ 1 in equilibrium, it follows that −μ/((φt/φ) − μ) ≤ −μ/(1 − μ), implying that
Eq. (A6) is redundant.
In summary, if the financial intermediary imposes a credit constraint bt ≥ −μwt/(1−μ),
which is the participation constraint of the financial intermediary, borrowers never default.
By letting μ/(1− μ) := ν, we obtain the credit constraint bt ≥ −νwt, as shown in the main
text.
As μ, or equivalently ν, increases, it becomes more diﬃcult for the borrowers to withdraw
their investment without repaying their obligations. If we consider these variables as being
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Table 1: Inequality and financial development (all countries)
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inequality OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
Private credit -2.648 -3.857 -2.396 -13.316** -14.227** -8.822
(2.936) (3.215) (3.493) (5.848) (6.371) (6.820)
GDP per capita (log) -0.884 -0.012 1.203 1.575 1.966 2.185
(1.129) (1.237) (1.292) (1.551) (1.578) (1.535)
Education -1.251*** -1.157** -1.277*** -1.277*** -1.022* -1.177**
(0.354) (0.479) (0.472) (0.388) (0.547) (0.515)
Democracy -0.054 0.016 -0.036 0.015
(0.040) (0.054) (0.043) (0.055)
Political risk -0.220** -0.184*
(0.096) (0.104)
Constant 55.645*** 52.243*** 50.513*** 39.518*** 38.239*** 42.440***
(7.584) (8.298) (8.520) (10.405) (10.822) (11.370)
First stage F statistic 8.50 10.09 7.40
Hansen test p=0.27 p=0.52 p=0.56
Observations 119 89 89 118 89 89
Notes. The asterisks ***, **, and * are the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.
The numbers in the parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. French and
German legal origins are used as instrumental variables for private credit in columns (4) to
(6). “p =” is the p-value of a statistical test.
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Table 2: Inequality and financial development (42 financially open countries,
cutoﬀ: 60 percentile)
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inequality OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
Private credit -5.063 -4.931 -4.525 43.690*** 33.675*** 27.908***
(5.438) (5.256) (5.404) (14.919) (12.536) (10.125)
GDP per capita (log) -2.491 -1.009 1.433 -14.733*** -11.524*** -7.052
(2.179) (2.159) (2.779) (4.457) (4.157) (4.994)
Education -0.337 -0.520 -0.924 -0.408 -0.654 -1.092
(0.755) (0.723) (0.794) (1.065) (0.990) (1.030)
Democracy -0.112* 0.017 -0.060 0.078
(0.060) (0.073) (0.107) (0.106)
Political risk -0.337* -0.383
(0.181) (0.269)
Constant 64.315*** 60.243*** 54.716*** 142.100*** 126.529*** 109.550***
(14.238) (14.378) (14.977) (29.524) (26.360) (26.275)
First stage F statistic 5.94 11.51 11.10
Hansen test p=0.97 p=0.67 p=0.89
Observations 42 36 36 42 36 36
Notes. The asterisks ***, **, and * are the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.
The numbers in the parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Scandinavian
and Socialist legal origins are used as instrumental variables for private credit in columns
(4) to (6). “p =” is the p-value of a statistical test.
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Table 3: Inequality and financial development (49 financially closed countries,
cutoﬀ: 40 percentile)
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inequality OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
Private credit 0.773 -1.892 -1.466 -14.943*** -15.657*** -15.352***
(6.600) (6.465) (6.571) (4.747) (4.780) (5.182)
GDP per capita (log) 1.105 3.577** 3.962** 3.378** 5.185*** 5.271***
(1.553) (1.583) (1.840) (1.482) (1.668) (1.895)
Education -1.517*** -2.057*** -2.028** -1.523*** -1.941** -1.934**
(0.491) (0.748) (0.743) (0.522) (0.854) (0.841)
Democracy 0.042 0.060 0.099 0.103
(0.073) (0.093) (0.084) (0.102)
Political risk -0.084 -0.023
(0.163) (0.155)
Constant 40.478*** 22.147* 22.092* 26.733** 10.021 10.170
(10.983) (11.310) (12.205) (10.651) (12.152) (12.059)
First stage F statistic 25.32 67.46 56.65
Hansen test p=0.22 p=0.66 p=0.62
Observations 49 36 36 49 36 36
Notes. The asterisks ***, **, and * are the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.
The numbers in the parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. French and
German legal origins are used as instrumental variables for private credit in columns (4) to
(6). “p =” is the p-value of a statistical test.
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Table 4: Inequality and financial development (dynamic panel data analysis)
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inequality system system system system system system
GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM
Lagged inequality 0.919*** 0.918*** 0.942*** 0.974*** 0.941*** 0.974***
(0.076) (0.076) (0.061) (0.068) (0.061) (0.063)
Private credit 0.848 0.949 0.721 -0.070 -0.298 -0.232
(0.939) (0.750) (0.742) (0.984) (0.808) (0.835)
Financial openness -0.189 -0.289** -0.218** -0.423** -0.548** -0.406**
(0.132) (0.111) (0.099) (0.202) (0.256) (0.187)
Private credit 0.210* 0.256* 0.200*
× Financial openness (0.114) (0.139) (0.103)
GDP per capita (log) -1.124 1.098 0.946 -1.091 0.967* 1.092





Political risk -0.043 -0.050
(0.052) (0.050)
Constant 7.100 -2.048 -2.337 4.155 -2.759 -4.003
(8.367) (6.807) (6.079) (7.186) (5.870) (6.421)
F test p=0.05 p=0.08 p=0.04
No. of instruments 39 39 39 52 52 52
AR (2) test p=0.13 p=0.12 p=0.12 p=0.12 p=0.12 p=0.11
Hansen test p=0.25 p=0.28 p=0.16 p=0.33 p=0.40 p=0.27
Countries 114 107 107 114 107 107
Observations 397 377 377 397 377 377
Notes. The asterisks ***, **, and * are the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are Windmeijer’s (2005) corrected standard errors. Year dum-
mies are included in all regressions. The null hypothesis of the F test is that the coeﬃcients
of private credit and its interaction term with financial openness are simultaneously equal
to zero. “p =”is the p-value of a statistical test. The AR(2) test is the Arellano-Bond serial
correlation test, where the null hypothesis is that a second-order serial correlation does not
exist in the diﬀerenced error terms.
31
Table 5: Net liabilities and financial development (dynamic panel data analysis)
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Net liabilities Total Total Total Debt Debt Debt
system system system system system system
GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM
Lagged net liabilities 0.516*** 0.509*** 0.499*** 0.598** 0.586** 0.534***
(0.167) (0.144) (0.173) (0.270) (0.263) (0.083)
Private credit 0.549*** 0.538** 0.592*** 0.760*** 0.780*** 0.799***
(0.197) (0.211) (0.223) (0.173) (0.183) (0.185)
GDP per capita (log) 0.073 0.067 -0.024 0.027 -0.034 -0.095
(0.245) (0.271) (0.324) (0.191) (0.241) (0.257)
Political risk -0.029 -0.027 -0.039 -0.033** -0.028 -0.030
(0.019) (0.021) (0.030) (0.017) (0.020) (0.023)
Inflation 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Capital controls 0.207 0.060
(0.286) (0.228)
Constant 1.223 1.152 2.622 1.728* 1.956* 2.539
(1.174) (1.286) (2.138) (0.892) (1.085) (1.616)
No. of instruments 18 18 18 18 18 18
AR (2) test p=0.14 p=0.12 p=0.16 p=0.26 p=0.28 p=0.28
Hansen test p=0.22 p=0.20 p=0.20 p=0.57 p=0.55 p=0.50
Countries 120 119 117 120 119 117
Observations 445 438 433 446 439 434
Notes. The asterisks ***, **, and * are the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respec-
tively. The numbers in parentheses are Windmeijer’s (2005) corrected standard errors. Year
dummies are included in all the regressions. “p=” is the p-value of a statistical test. The
AR(2) test is the Arellano-Bond serial correlation test where the null hypothesis is that a









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A3: Descriptive statistics for Table 1
Variables Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Inequality 119 38.657 9.258 22.055 62.493
Private credit 119 0.449 0.385 0.022 1.569
GDP per capita (log) 119 8.589 1.259 5.996 10.590
Education 119 6.563 2.956 0.777 12.513
Democracy 89 60.378 26.142 16.667 100
Political risk 89 59.334 17.482 30.167 94.417
Financial openness 119 1.782 1.680 0.428 12.909
Notes. These statistics are based on the averaged values for 119 countries including in Table
1.
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Table A4: Descriptive statistics for Table 4
Variables Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Inequality 539 38.394 9.673 16.757 67.756
Private credit 560 0.460 0.429 0.014 2.336
Financial openness 576 1.862 2.173 0.257 23.132
GDP per capita (log) 587 8.548 1.268 5.852 10.782
Education 570 6.688 3.044 0.108 13.218
Democracy 510 68.605 23.731 10.139 100
Political risk 510 65.944 13.931 28.383 93.833
Notes. These statistics are based on the five-year averaged values for 120 countries including
in Table 4.
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Table A5: Descriptive statistics for Table 5
Variables Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Total net liabilities 578 0.318 1.141 -10.011 5.079
Debt net liabilities 580 0.275 1.084 -9.941 4.776
Private credit 552 0.468 0.431 0.004 2.336
GDP per capita (log) 582 8.705 1.281 5.517 11.224
Political risk 575 65.035 14.243 21.517 93.833
Inflation 565 58.372 376.750 -19.102 6424.987
Capital controls 557 0.376 1.564 -1.844 2.478
Notes. These statistics are based on the five-year averaged values for 120 countries including
in Table 5.
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Table A6: Inequality and financial development (56 financially open countries,
cutoﬀ: 50 percentile)
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inequality OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
Private credit -5.565 -5.989 -4.608 33.543** 54.398** 38.426**
(3.734) (4.344) (4.667) (15.974) (25.783) (16.501)
GDP per capita (log) -1.391 -1.438 0.130 -12.530** -18.746** -10.804*
(1.763) (1.896) (2.146) (4.923) (8.040) (5.786)
Education -0.955* -0.428 -0.816 -0.133 -0.142 -0.892
(0.519) (0.570) (0.621) (0.712) (1.113) (0.995)
Democracy -0.095* -0.009 0.029 0.139
(0.055) (0.060) (0.154) (0.117)
Political risk -0.235** -0.402***
(0.107) (0.154)
Constant 59.551*** 63.688*** 60.983*** 129.378*** 170.003*** 133.086***
(11.784) (12.691) (12.926) (31.935) (48.441) (33.602)
First stage F statistic 6.89 9.21 10.16
Hansen test p=0.19 p=0.54 p=0.91
Observations 56 44 44 56 44 44
Notes. The asterisks ***, **, and * are the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Scandinavian and
Socialist legal origins are used as instrumental variables for private credit in columns (4) to
(6). “p =” is the p-value of a statistical test.
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Table A7: Inequality and financial development (26 financially open countries,
cutoﬀ: 75 percentile)
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inequality OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
Private credit 7.363* 5.094 5.034 23.706*** 23.051** 23.883**
(3.618) (3.444) (3.599) (7.596) (9.530) (10.794)
GDP per capita (log) -7.532*** -5.271*** -5.110 -12.220*** -11.376*** -12.526**
(1.565) (1.351) (3.196) (3.003) (3.941) (5.998)
Education -0.977 -1.372** -1.384** -1.000 -1.620** -1.555**
(0.845) (0.646) (0.617) (0.837) (0.763) (0.738)
Democracy -0.079 -0.074 0.005 -0.023
(0.061) (0.073) (0.088) (0.079)
Political risk -0.014 0.088
(0.253) (0.281)
Constant 106.570*** 96.248*** 95.526*** 137.740*** 135.222*** 140.672***
(10.825) (8.978) (15.301) (19.533) (24.533) (32.524)
First stage F statistic 15.04 6.01 5.62
Hansen test p=0.44 p=0.54 p=0.61
Observations 26 22 22 26 22 22
Notes. The asterisks ***, **, and * are the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Scandinavian and
Socialist legal origins are used as intsrumental variables for private credit in columns (4) to
(6). “p =” is the p-value of a statistical test.
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Table A8: Inequality and financial development (63 financially closed countries,
cutoﬀ: 50 percentile)
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inequality OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
Private credit 2.703 0.034 0.854 -15.589** -16.056*** -15.062**
(4.990) (5.009) (4.993) (6.349) (5.371) (6.407)
GDP per capita (log) 0.236 2.648* 3.354** 2.725** 4.299*** 4.561***
(1.379) (1.365) (1.594) (1.358) (1.524) (1.679)
Education -1.619*** -2.011*** -1.961*** -1.432*** -1.712** -1.700**
(0.475) (0.633) (0.607) (0.547) (0.796) (0.765)
Democracy 0.013 0.048 0.071 0.085
(0.063) (0.083) (0.072) (0.088)
Political risk -0.151 -0.070
(0.142) (0.157)
Constant 46.938*** 30.424*** 30.081*** 31.052*** 17.505 17.843
(9.423) (9.429) (10.479) (9.447) (10.675) (10.874)
First stage F statistic 18.10 32.46 20.62
Hansen test p=0.07 p=0.43 p=0.41
Observations 63 45 45 63 45 45
Notes. The asterisks ***, **, and * are the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. French and Ger-
man legal origins are used as instrumental variables for private credit in columns (4) to (6).
“p =” is the p-value of a statistical test.
41
Table A9: Inequality and financial development (31 financially closed countries,
cutoﬀ: 25 percentile)
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inequality OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
Private credit 6.894 7.744 8.153 -16.557** -12.218 -11.678
(11.466) (9.665) (10.218) (7.927) (8.911) (8.522)
GDP per capita (log) 2.705 3.707 3.222 5.019*** 5.177** 5.056*
(1.694) (2.209) (2.669) (1.639) (2.127) (2.691)
Education -2.193*** -2.887*** -2.974*** -2.171*** -2.555** -2.578***
(0.619) (0.813) (0.823) (0.585) (0.993) (0.984)
Democracy 0.083 0.069 0.130 0.127
(0.116) (0.132) (0.132) (0.146)
Political risk 0.080 0.014
(0.191) (0.186)
Constant 29.400** 21.089 22.112 16.724 10.656 11.083
(12.499) (18.458) (19.032) (12.232) (18.102) (18.960)
First stage F statistic 130.33 69.62 61.37
Hansen test p=0.40 p=0.22 p=0.21
Observations 31 25 25 31 25 25
Notes. The asterisks ***, **, and * are the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. French and Ger-
man legal origins are used as instrumental variables for private credit in columns (4) to (6).
“p =” is the p-value of a statistical test.
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Table A10: Inequality and financial development in financially open countries:
sensitivity analysis on instrumental variables
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inequality IV IV IV IV IV IV
Private credit 43.272*** 30.012*** 28.900*** 44.033** 36.458* 27.234**
(15.032) (7.933) (7.606) (21.413) (18.651) (13.695)
GDP per capita (log) -14.624*** -10.561*** -7.274 -14.807*** -12.120** -6.916
(5.205) (3.721) (4.887) (5.232) (5.094) (5.274)
Education -0.404 -0.618 -1.108 -0.413 -0.731 -1.071
(1.045) (0.903) (1.003) (1.105) (1.128) (1.092)
Democracy -0.057 0.079 -0.059 0.078
(0.101) (0.107) (0.114) (0.105)
Political risk -0.388 -0.382
(0.282) (0.265)
Scandinavian legal origin -0.150 -1.405 0.394
(4.466) (2.922) (2.967)
Socialist legal origin 0.198 2.420 -0.632
(5.991) (5.724) (4.578)
Constant 141.387*** 120.047*** 111.215*** 142.562*** 130.445*** 108.633***
(35.247) (24.305) (26.482) (33.577) (32.157) (28.253)
First stage F statistic 8.76 20.80 20.73 5.46 4.57 4.55
Observations 42 36 36 42 36 36
Notes. The asterisks ***, **, and * are the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Scandinavian
legal origin is directly incorporated in the second stage and Socialist legal origin is used as
an instrumental variable in columns (1) to (3). Socialist legal origin is directly incorporated
in the second stage and Scandinavian legal origin is used as an instrumental variable in
columns (4) to (6)
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Table A11: Inequality and financial development in financially closed countries:
sensitivity analysis on instrumental variables
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inequality IV IV IV IV IV IV
Private credit -5.761 -11.127 -10.357 -36.418 -23.058 -23.311
(5.245) (8.810) (8.258) (26.433) (22.069) (22.139)
GDP per capita (log) -0.260 3.343 3.354 5.283*** 5.643*** 5.930**
(3.153) (4.282) (4.227) (2.041) (2.066) (2.346)
Education -0.239 -1.352 -1.294 -1.911*** -2.204** -2.217**
(0.989) (1.454) (1.361) (0.729) (1.096) (1.092)
Democracy 0.082 0.089 0.126 0.140
(0.100) (0.111) (0.083) (0.107)
Political risk -0.039 -0.059
(0.139) (0.158)
French legal origin 7.070 3.352 3.616
(4.821) (7.188) (6.858)
German legal origin 24.266 8.963 10.018
(26.904) (23.360) (23.504)
Constant 42.867*** 19.416 20.317 18.930* 8.283 8.321
(16.599) (24.860) (23.356) (11.240) (12.730) (13.071)
First stage F statistic 23.85 30.14 28.64 6.96 6.13 5.85
Observations 49 36 36 49 36 36
Notes. The asterisks ***, **, and * are the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. German legal
origin and French legal origin are used as instrumental variables for private credit in columns
(1) to (3) and in columns (4) to (6), respectively.
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Figure 1: The supply-demand analysis of a financial market
O
Liabilities (before)
Liabilities (after)
r0
r1
r¯
S
S
D2
D2
D0
D0
D1
D1
F
Interest rate
45
